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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--------------------------------------------------------------JULIE M. CHILD
PlaintiffAppellant,
Case No. 18169

-vsTHE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
DefendantRespondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a review of a decision of the Board of Review
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, finding, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated (1953) § 35-4-S(a), that plaintiff voluntarily
left work without good cause.

In making its decision, the

Board of Review adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of
law of the decision of the Appeals Referee, dated December l,
1981.

(R.0010)

The Appeals Referee held that the plaintiff was

ineligible for Unemployment Compensation benefits beginning
August 16, 1981, and ending when she had earned wages in bona
fide

covered employment equal to at least six times her weekly

benefit amount and is otherwise eligible.
DISPOSITION BELOW
The Industrial Commission of Utah, through its Board
of Review, affirmed the previous decisions of the Department
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff requests the Court to· reverse the holding
of the Board of Review and enter its judgment that defendant's
decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that
plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to Unemployment
compensation benefits from August 16, 1981, until she is no
longer otherwise eligible.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are clear, simple, and uncontroverted.
Plaintiff left her employment with Weber State College in
Ogden, Utah, on August 14, 1981.

She had been employed there

as a secretary for seven months.

(R.0026-0027)

The reason plaintiff gave for her termination was
that she was moving to Sacramento, California, where her husband
began attending law school on August 24, 1981.

In order for her

to retain her marriage and family relationship it was necessary
for her to move with him.

Plaintiff's husband was accepted to

a school in California and placed on a waiting list at the
University of Utah Law School.

Plaintiff did not know exactly

if, and when, she would need to terminate her employment and
move with her husband.

The resignation she submitted to Weber

State College was contingent upon her being required to leave
Utah.

Plaintiff did not search for employment prior to her move

to California because she was not certain she would be moving
there more than one week before her move.

(R.0027-0028)

Plaintiff left Utah on August 16, 1981, and arrived in
California on August 17, 1981.

She immediately started making

applications for employment and on September 14, 1981, she was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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hired by E.F. Hutton and Company, Inc., as an Administrative
Assistant to the Regional Vice President of Consulting Services.
Prior to her obtaining employment, plaintiff had made an active
job search.

The employer•s representative did not controvert

any of appellant's contentions.

(R.0027-0029)

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANT'S DETERMINATION THAT PLAINTIFF LACKED
GOOD CAUSE FOR VOLUNTARILY LEAVING HER EMPLOYMENT WAS ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE, UNSUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND NOT IN COMPLIANCE
WITH ITS OWN REGULATIONS OR THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT.
The appropriate standard of review in a case such as
this is stated in Gocke v. Wiesley, 18 U.2d 245, 420 P.2d 45,
(1966):
A reversal of an order of the Industrial
Commission denying compensation can only
be justified if there is no substantial
evidence to sustain the determination and
there is proof of facts giving rise to the
right of compensation so clear and persuasive that the Commission's refusal to
accept it and make an award was clearly
capricious, arbitrary, and unreasonable.
Citing Kennecott Copper Corp. Employees
v. Department of Employment Security, 13
U.2d 262, 372 P.2d 987 (1962).
The Utah Supreme Court has held on more than one occasion that
where a decision of the Industrial Commission is unsupported
by substantial evidence, a reversal of the order is appropriate.
Martinez v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security,
25 U.2d 131, 477 P.2d 587 (1970); Kennecott Copper Corp. Employees
v. Department of Employment Security, supra., Gonzales v. Board

Of Review, Department of Employment Security, No. 17554 (Ut.
September 22, 1981).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In reviewing decisions of the Industrial Commission,
the supreme Court is required to review the record below.
Martinez v. Board of Review, Department of Employment Security,
supra., Denby v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 567
P.2d 626 (Ut. 1977).

Furthermore, the Court is not bound by

conclusions of the Board of Review and will not substitute missing
findings in order to corroborate a decision of the Industrial
Commission which is not supported by the record.

Gocke v.

Wiesley, supra., at 46.
The decisions of the Industrial Commission are not
automatically affirmed.

The Utah Supreme Court, in Blamires

v. Board of Review, Etc., 584 P.2d 889, at 892 (Ut. 1978),
held:
The findings of the Board are only final
and binding upon us when supported by
substantial, competent evidence.
Whitcombe v. Dept. of Emp. Sec. Ind.
Q.Qmm., 563 P.2d 807 (Ut. 1977).
In the present case, the decision of the Board of Review, denying
unemployment benefits to the plaintiff, was not supported by
substantial competent evidence and, therefore, must be reversed.
Utah Code Annotated (1953) §35-4-5(a) denies benefits
to a claimant who voluntarily leaves work without good cause:
An individual shall be ineligible for benefits
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work
voluntarily without good cause, if so found by
the commission, and for each week thereafter
until the claimant has perfonned services in
bona fide covered employment and earned wages
for such services equal to at least six times
the claimant's weekly benefit amount; provided,
that no claimant shall be ineligible for benefits
if the claimant leaves work under circumstances
of such a nature that it would be contrary to
equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The commission shall in cooperation with the
employer consider for the purposes of this
act, the reasonableness of the claimant's
actions, and the extent to which the actions
evidence a genuine continuing attachment to
the labor market in reaching a determination
of whether the ineligibility of a claimant is
contrary to equity and good conscience.
The General Rules of Adjudication of the Utah Department of
Employment Security (U.D.E.S.) at VOLUNTARY LEAVING§ 210
further define what constitutes "good cause".

This section

states:
"Good cause" as used in unemployment insurance
is cause which would justify an employee's
voluntarily leaving work and becoming unemployed; the leaving must be for reasons which
would reasonably motivate in a similar situation
the average worker to give. up employment with
its wage rewards to become unemployed. To
constitute good cause, the circumstances which
compel the decision to leave must be real, not
imaginary; substantial, not trifling; and
reasonable, not whimsical.
There must be
some compulsion from outside and necessitous
circumstances. The standard of what constitutes
good cause is the standard of reasonableness as
applied to the average individual and not to
supersensitive.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Denby v. Bd. of Review of Indus.

£2.!!!!!t.,

supra., at 630, further defines "good cause".

Justice

Maughan, in his decision for the Court, stated:
"Good cause"has been defined as "such cause
as would similarly affect persons of reasonable and normal sensitivity, and is limited
to those instances where the unemployment
is caused by external pressures so compelling
that a reasonably prudent person, exercising
ordinary common sense and prudence, would be
justified in quitting under similar circumstances." (Citation omitted) Accord, Mills
v. Gronning, 581 P.2d 1334 (Ut. 1978).
Once a voluntary quit is established or admitted, the
claimant has the burden of establishing the termination was with
good cause.

U.D.E.S. General Rules of Adjudication, at VOLUNTARY

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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LEAVING§ 190.01; Denby v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm., supra.,
at 630.

Plaintiff has conceeded that she terminated her employ-

ment with Weber State College (R.0027) and has accepted the
burden of establishing her termination was for "good cause."
Plaintiff explained at her telephone hearing the reason
she terminated her employment.

In response to the Appeals

Referee's request for an explanation, she testified:

"Ah,

my husband was going to attend law school here in California
and in order to retain our marriage and our family relationship,
it was necessary for me to quit my employment and move with
him."

( R. 0027)

The record further substantiates this assertion.

(R.0013-0018, 0032-0034, 0040, 0042, 0043, 0044)
The U.D.E.S. General Rules of Adjudication, at
VOLUNTARY LEAVING § 50 provides:
As the Act does not specify that good cause
for leaving must be attributable to the
employer, all circumstances surrounding the
separation, personal, or job connected,
should be considered in determining whether
a disqualification applies.
(emphasis added)
Section 155.2 further provides:
When an individual voluntarily leaves a job
to move to another locality, the reason for
moving must be examined. Moving for a compelling reason such as to accompany a spouse
who was transferred to a new job out of the
area could indicate a good cause for leaving
a job.
Compelling personal reasons alone are considered as
"good cause" for terminating employment voluntarily under the
Utah statute.

Defendant's regulations, as cited above, reflect

this interpretation and, infact, urge examination of personal
circumstances in determining eligibility.

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The Appeals Referee's decision, adopted by the Board
of Review as their final decision, (R.0010) made the following
Findings of Fact, Conunents and Conclusion of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. Prior to filing a claim for unemployment
insurance benefits effective August 16, 1981,
the claimant earned $780 per month working as
a secretary for Weber State College from
January 26, 1981, to August 14, 1981. Her
weekly benefit amount is $94 for 36 weeks.
2.
The claimant voluntarily left her employment
to relocate with her husband in Sacramento, California. He had been accepted into law school
there.
Neither the claimant nor her husband
had any definite prospects of employment.
3.
The claimant began working for E.F. Hutton
as an Administrative Assistant on September 14,
1981, at $950 per month.
COMMENTS:
Section 35-4-5(a) of the Utah Employment Security
Act provides as shown on the attached sheet.
When an individual voluntarily leaves gainful
employment to move to another locality, the
reasons for moving must be examined. Moving
for a compelling reason such as a spouse's
being transferred by an employer or who has a
guarantee of a new job is considered to be
good cause. However, quitting a job for a noncompelling reason such as a desire to relocate
to another area to seek work or be close to
family is not held to be good cause.
In determining good cause, the Utah Employment
Security Act stresses that a spouse must be
moving to accept substantial employment.
In
the present case, the claimant's spouse was
moving to attend school and the family was to
accompany him. It is therefore held, the
claimant voluntarily left work for personal
non-compelling reasons and it is not considered
good cause in accordance with the Utah Employment
Security Act.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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CONCLUSION OF LAW:
The Appeals Referee, therefore, finds:
The claimant voluntarily left work without
good cause.
(R.0023-0024)
The Appeals Referee correctly states that in determining
whether a voluntary termination of employment due to a move to
another locality is disqualifying the reasons for such a move
must be examined.

However, his reasoning and application of

the law is flawed.
First, the Appeals Referee's premises assume his
conclusion.

His decision states: "Quitting a job for a non-

compelling reason such as a desire to relocate to another area
to seek work or be closer to family is not held to be good
cause."

(R.0023)

It is precisely those elements that must

be examined to determine whether the termination is compelling.
In other words, his decision presupposes that a claimant who
terminates his or her employment for a reason other than a
transfer of the spouse to new employment or a guarantee of new
employment is presumed to be non-compelling.
Second, the Appeals Referee stated that:

"In deter-

mining good cause, the Utah Employment Security Act stresses
that a spouse must be moving to accept substantial employment."
(R.0024)

This contention is totally unfounded.

The Appeals

Referee provides no support for his contention and plaintiff is
unaware of the existence of any authorative suppprt.

Defendant's

own regulations, as cited above, U.D.E.s. General Rules of
Adjudication, at VOLUNTARY LEAVING§§ 50, 155.2, provide that
all circumstances should be examined when an individual leaves
a job to move to another locality.

Indeed, these regulations

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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provide a presumption that a compelling reason such as accompanying
a spouse who was transferred to a new job indicates good cause,
but does not limit a conclusion only to those facts.

Therefore,

it is clear the defendant misperceived and misapplied the law.
Plaintiff submits the record supports a finding that
her termination was for personal compelling reasons that were
neither frivolous nor whimsical.

Plaintiff's only option other

than terminating her employment would have been to remain in
Utah while her husband moved to California and established
his permanent residence there.

Plaintiff's decision to accompany

her husband is based on the long standing tradition of the family
relationship.

To argue that a reasonable person would abrogate

the responsibility of a lawful marriage and family relationship
in order to comply with an arbitrary interpretation of a statute
by the defendant is repugnant to public policy.
The state has a vested interest in protecting the
integrity of the family unit.

To apply the interpretation the

defendant gives to Utah Code Annotated (1953) §35-4-5(a) would
be to ignore the importance, desirability and function of the
family unit.

It stretches the imagination to believe that a

reasonable person in a situation similar to that of the plaintiff
would be compelled to make a decision contrary to the one made
by the plaintiff.
The Colorado Court of Appeals in Briggs v. Industrial
Commission, 539 P.2d 1303 (Colo. App. 1975), at 1304-5, stated
that:
First of all, we rule that one who becomes unemployed as the result of leaving employment
in order to travel to another place to live with
his or her spouse has not "voluntarily" left work.
The pressure of family and marital responsibilities
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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and claimant's capitulation to,~t~h·em
--~t·r•a·n·s~.....
f o~rm
...~~
what is ostensibly voluntary unemployment into
involuntary unemployment.
Bliley Electric Co.
v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
45 A.2d 898 (Pa. 1946).
Indeed, it would be
repugnant to public policy, which encourages
and promotes the family as a social unit in
society, to require that a husband, in certain
circumstances, be denied unemployment benefits
merely because he chooses to live with his wife.
Although the statute under which Briggs was decided was declared
unconstitutional on other bases, the Colorado Court of Appeals
later in Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Com. v. Dept. of Labor and
Employment, 579 P.2d 65

(Col. App. 1978), held that the rational

of Briggs, as quoted above, remained viable.

The court also

made reference to Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Com. v. Dept. of
Labor and Employment, 559 P.2d 252 (Col. App. 1976) where they
affirmed an award of benefits to a wife who left her job

to

accompany her husband who was attending college in another state.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Coma v. Depto of Labor
and Employment, 579 P.2d 65 (Col. App. 1978) was reversed in
592 P.2d 808 (Col. 1979) without reaching the issue of whether
a married woman who terminates her employment in order to relocate
with her husband is deemed to be unavoidably unemployed within the
meaning of a special Colorado statute.

Although the statutes used

by the Colorado courts are and were different from Utah's statute,
plaintiff submits that the reasoning of the Colorado Court of
Appeals is consistent with the Utah statute and the construction
urged by a liberal interpretation.

Johnson v. Board of Review of

Industrial Commission, 320 P.2d 315 (Ut. 1958).
Also, in Ayers v. Employment Security Dept., 536 Po 2d
610 (Washo 1975), at 611-12, the Washington Supreme Court stated:
Many factors may enter into the decision of a
family as to where they shall live and work.
It is often a substantial factor to be conSponsored by the S.J.
Quinney Law Library.
Funding
digitization
provided by the Institute
of Museum and Library Services
sidered
that
itforis
desirable
f ,...._,..i..w.4.1~~
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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~b·b~~~ee)flJ'~the family together.
If
employment for the husband and for the
wife are not available in the same area,
it is a compelling personal reason, and
therefore, good cause, for one of the
spouses to leave employment and go to the
place of employment of the other spouse in
order to keep the family together. The
decision of which place of employment should
be accepted must not be governed by any
arbitrary rule, but should be decided upon
a consideration Of all relevant factors.
It is generally a decision which the spouses
should make for themselves, subject to the
need to make a reasonable decision.

Wherefore, plaintiff submits that the defendant has
misperceived and misapplied the law in her situation and urges the
court to apply a construction of Utah Code Annotated (1953),
§ 35-4-S(a), that promotes the purposes of the Utah Employment
Security Act while, at the same time, strengthens and protects the
integrity of the family unit.

A contrary holding would send a clear

signal to the defendant commission that the only compelling reason
a spouse may have to terminate his or her employment with good cause
is to accompany the other spouse who has been transferred by an
employer or who has a guarantee of a new job.

Such an inflexible

interpretation would vitiate any other compelling reason that
would force a person to terminate his or her employment in order
to maintain and promote a family relationship.

As stated above,

the state has a vested interest in protecting the family unit.
POINT II.
DEFENDANT'S DETERMINATION THAT IT WOULD NOT
BE CONTRARY TO EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE TO
IMPOSE A DISQUALIFICATION AGAINST PLAINTIFF
SHOULD BE REVERSED SINCE IT IS UNSUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Even assuming arguendo that plaintiff has not established
good cause for leaving her employment, it would be contrary to
equity and good conscience to find that her actions are disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-11Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

qualifying under the Utah Employment Security Act. 1

The Act

provides that:
(N)o claimant shall be ineligible for benefits
if the claimant leaves work under circumstances
of such a nature that it would be contrary to
equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification.
The Commission shall in cooperation with the
employer consider for the purposes of this
act, the reasonableness of claimant's actions,
and the extent to which the a~tions evidence
a genuine continuing attachment to the labor
market in reaching a determination of whether
the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary
to equity and good conscience. U.C.A. section
35-4-5(a).
This provision is further discussed in the department's

regulation~

U.D.E.S. General Rules of Adjudication at VOLUNTARY LEAVING
Section 210 provides that:
If it is determined that "good cause" does not
exist, then the surrounding circumstances must
be reviewed to determine whether the claimant's
actions were such that a disqualification under
this section of law would be contrary to equity
and good conscience.
The statute requires that
three factors be considered in making a determination of whether equity and good conscience
required the disqualification to be abated:
1.

The purposes of the Employment Security Act;

2.

The reasonableness of the claimant's actions;
and

3.

The extent to which the claimant• s actions
evidence a genuine attachment to the labor
market.

1

Plaintiff submitted this argument to the Appeals Referee
(R.0035-0037) however, he failed to make any express findings
regarding plaintiff's contentions.
Plaintiff also alleged the
same contentions before the Board of Review (R.0016-0017). By
adopting the decision of the Appeals Referee the Board also made
no express findings.
However, plaintiff submits that the Appeals
Referee's decisions impliedly rejects plaintiff's contentions and
is subject to. review by this court.
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,-c__ '·( '-r

Prior to the 1979 amendments to the Employment
Security Act, the Utah Supreme Court has held
on several occasions that the purpose of the
Act was to assist the worker and his family
in times when, without fault on his part, he
was out of work and to provide stabilitv for
the economy by assuring continuity of purchasing power.
The 1979 amendments altered that
purpose to the extent that although a claimant
may be "at fault" in his resulting unemployment,
he will not be disqualified from receiving
benefits if the actions which led to his
unemployment evidence a degree of reasonableness under the circumstances and
demonstrate a genuine continuing attachment
to the labor market.
Any determination involving mitigating circumstances must be made with
a sensitive regard for fairness to the parties.
Thus, the statute and defendant's regulations, require
three factors that must be considered in making this determination.
First, the purposes of the Employment security Act.

The Utah

Supreme Court in Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Industrial Commission,

!!=£,., 134 P.2d 479 (Ut. 1943) at 485, held that the Act's purpose
is:
(R)emedial to protect the health, morals,
and welfare of the people by providing a
cushion against the shock and rigors of
unemployment.
Being remedial under the
police powers and not imposing limitations
on basic rights, it should be liberally
construed.
(emphasis added)
Further, the Employment Security Act is to be liberally
construed and administered and the prerogatives of the Commission
are necessarily to be exercised in accordance with the social
purposes of the Act.
Commission, supra.

Johnson v. Board of Review of Industrial
Also, i t has been held in Utah's sister state,

Colorado, that the courts in construing the Act should apply the
construction which favors the claimant.

Allen v. Industrial

Commission, 540 P.2d 350 (Colo. 1975).
Since the purpose of the act is remedial to provide a
cushion to the shock, and rigors of unemployment and is to impose
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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no limitation on basic rights, this factor balances in favor of
plaintiff in determining whether it would be against equity and
good conscience to impose a disqualification.
Second, the reasonableness of plaintiff's actions must
be considered.

Although plaintiff submitted to the Appeal's

Referee her contentions regarding this argument (R.0037) he made
no specific findings as to plaintiff's reasonableness, nor did the
Board of Review.

However, his decision impliedly rejects plaintif

contentions of reasonableness, and wrongfully so.
As established in Point I, infra.; plaintiff's termination
of her employment was not an act of an unreasonable person.

On

the contrary, it is not conceivable that a successful marriage
could
states.

exist with the partners permanently residing in different
Plaintiff, reasonably realizing this fact, made a deliber

decision which was not whimsical or rash and not unlike that of an
other reasonable person similarly situated.

Therefore, this facto

also balances in favor of the plaintiff.
Third, plaintiff's actions must evidence a genuine
attachment to the labor market.

The record reflects that plaintif

terminated her employment on August 14, 1981.
0042, 0044)

(R. 0026, 0032, 0039

She left Utah on August 16, 1981, and arrived in

California on August 17, 1981.

(R.0027)

She registered for work

at the employment office on August 19, 1981, (R.0040-0045)2 and
made an active job search.

(R. 003 2)

2P1aintiff testified that she registered for employment on
August 20, 1981 (R.0027), however, her applications are all dated
August 19, 1981, the day she actually registered for work.
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She became employed on September 14, 1981, as an Administrative
Assistant at E.F. Hutton & Co. Inc., where she is presently

(R.0028)

employed.

These actions clearly evidence that plaintiff was
genuinely attached to the labor market.

Indeed, she terminated

her employment only two days before leaving Utah and registered
for work only two days after arriving in California.

She became

steadily employed exactly one month after she left Utah.

such a

diligent effort evidences a genuine attachment to the labor
market.
Therefore, the weight of the evidence substantiates
that an imposition of a disqualification would be contrary to
equity and good conscience and the defendant erred in not so
finding.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has established that terminating her
employment for the personally compelling reason of accompanying
her husband who moved out of the state to attend school was for
good cause under the Utah Employment Security Act.

Defendant's

detennination to the contrary is not supported by substantial
evidence and should be reversed.

In addition, the imposition

of a disqualification would be contrary to equity and good
conscience.
DATED this

/!}'~y of March,

1981,

Respectfully Submitted,

~cJl:l· cJdL
P

-15-
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of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to K. Allan Zabel,
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/Sfu day of March,
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